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ARTICLES
SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL OF BANK
OFFICIALS UNDER THE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS REFORM RECOVERY AND
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1989 ("FIRREA")
Robert J. Basil, Esq.*
In 1966 Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966
("FISA"). Among FISA's provisions was subsection 8(e) to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e).' This subsection granted sweeping powers
to "authorized" federal banking agencies2 to suspend and remove bank officials,
in order to protect the interests of the federally insured depository banking
system. In the wake of the savings & loan disaster, these powers were significantly
fortified and expanded upon by the enactment of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).3 The officials subject
to suspension and removal under FIRREA include not only directors and officers,
but also such third-parties as controlling stockholders, consultants, lawyers, and
accountants. 4 In addition, these enforcement powers may be exercised without
reliance upon judicial proceedings in an Article III court, although judicial appeals
are available.
To effect removal of a bank official, an agency must make three determi-
nations which are referred to in this article as "improper conduct," "negative
consequences," and "scienter." The statute prescribes the requirements of each
of these determinations, which are to be considered by the agencies' own
administrative law judges (ALJ's).
FIRREA provides that once an official is removed from his position he is
automatically subject to a total ban from the insured depository industry. This
ban permanently prohibits the official from participation in any federally insured
depository institution. Agencies need not await the outcome of the administrative
procedure to effect this blanket ban. FIRREA grants the agencies authority, upon
making certain preliminary determinations (without an agency hearing), to suspend
* A.B., Rutgers University (1973); J.D., Rutgers University School of Law-Camden (1988);
currently associated with the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae specializing in Banking
and Legal Malpractice Law.
I. This subsection had its genesis in section 30 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 77
(1966. Section 30 provided for the removal of Bank officers and directors by the Federal Reserve
Board. However, after its enactment, section 30 fell quickly into desuetude. See S. Rep. No. 1482,
89th Cong. Ist Sess. reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. (hereinafter "FISA report") 3532, 3540.
2. The authorized banking agencies are now the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office
of Thrift Supervision. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1989).
3. Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9 1989).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (1989).
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officials immediately from all participation in the insured depository industry
pending the outcome of the agencies' removal procedure.'
During the past decade the federal courts have attempted, sporadically, to
define the limits of the authority granted by FISA. Unfortunately, there have
been relatively few reported cases and several important issues remain unresolved.
In addition, there has been only one reported case involving suspension or
removal of directors or officers since FIRREA was enacted. 6 As a result, there
is undoubtedly a great deal of uncertainty in the banking industry regarding the
type of conduct that will trigger FIRREA's severe suspension or removal sanc-
tions.7 The issues surrounding suspension and removal of banking officials are
of no small consequence to members of the banking industry. The sudden, forced
removal of key personnel from participation in a financial institution impacts
heavily upon the financial interests and reputation of both the removed official
and the subject institution."
The goals of this article are to summarize the recent developments concerning
the agencies' authority to suspend and remove officials under FISA, as modified
by FIRREA, and to identify and analyze the outstanding issues generated by the
grant of these extraordinary powers under these two Acts. It is hoped that this
effort will aid bank officials and government agencies in understanding the limits
of their legal duties and authority in this area.
I. SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL OF OFFICIALS
Under the detailed statutory scheme of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e), removal of an
official must follow a prescribed course. However, the threshold issue in any
removal action is whether the targeted official is a person subject to this
enforcement provision. To define those officials subject to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e),
FIRREA introduced the term "institution-affiliated party." 9 The enactment of
this new definition effected a broad expansion of the classes of individuals subject
to suspension and removal, as such individuals were formerly limited to: "offi-
cer[s] or director[s] of an insured institution."'10 Perhaps the most notable effect
of the new FIRREA definition is the inclusion of certain classes of individuals
who are not employees of the institutions. These new potential targets include
shareholders, consultants, joint venturers, and, under certain circumstances, in-
dependent contractors such as attorneys, appraisers, or accountants." Indeed,
FIRREA's reach appears to extend to any significant participant in the affairs
of the institution. However, this new statutory language did not alone resolve an
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(3) (1989).
6. See Greenberg v. Comptroller of the Currency, 938 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1991).
7. The court in Greenberg did not discuss in any detail the allegations against the directors
involved in that case.
8. See FISA report, supra note 1, at 3539. The report sagely observed the following:
[the power to suspend or remove an officer or director of a bank or savings and loan
association] is an extraordinary power, which can do great harm to the individual
affected and to his institution and to the financial system as a whole. It must be strictly
limited and carefully guarded.
Id.
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (1989).
10. (former) 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (1982).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(3) & (4) (1989).
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issue which had been the subject of two reported pre-FIRREA cases: Is an agency
authorized to "remove" an official who previously resigned his position? Reso-
lution of this issue is critically important to both the agencies and bank officials.
If former officials are not subject to removal, targeted officials may avoid the
blanket industry bans and the stiff criminal sanctions provided for them under
12 U.S.C. § 1818(j) (1989)12 by effecting a timely resignation.
The first reported challenge to an agency's authority to remove a former
official under FISA was in Somerfield v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.3
In that case, Somerfield filed for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in
opposition to a notice of removal served upon him by the FDIC pursuant to 12
U.S.C. § 1818(e). 14 Somerfield had been Chairman of the Board of Directors
and Chief Executive Officer of Peoples Bank and Trust Company, Wartburg,
Tennessee. 5 The notice of removal was served on November 2, 1984. However,
Somerfield claimed that he had resigned his position on November 1, the day
before receiving the notice.' 6
In response to Somerfield's challenge, the FDIC successfully asserted that
the truth of Somerfield's resignation claim was an outstanding issue of fact to
be determined at the agency level.' 7 Accordingly, in reviewing Somerfield's request
for relief the district court did not reach the issue of whether 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)
applied to former directors. Instead, the court denied Somerfield's petition and
remanded the case to the FDIC for further fact-finding on the resignation issue.'"
In refusing to resolve the "former director" issue prior to the FDIC hearing,
the district court properly gave deference to the fact-finding function of the
FDIC. Certainly the date of resignation was a material fact which the court
needed to rule on Somerfield's challenge. If Somerfield was still involved in bank
operations on November 2, any ruling on the "former director" issue would
have been superfluous. However, the Somerfield decision left the banking industry
and the agencies without guidance on the "former director" question.
Four years after Somerfield, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
faced a challenge to a final order removing a bank officer who had undoubtedly
resigned prior to receiving his notice of removal. In that case, Stoddard v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 9 the Comptroller of the Currency
initiated a removal procedure some 10 months after Stoddard had resigned from
his positions as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
Michigan National Corporation.2 The Comptroller asserted jurisdiction under
section 8(e)(l). 21 After a hearing and certification to the Board of Governors of
12. Subsection (j) provides a fine up to $1 million and imprisonment (up to) 5 years for officials
who, without prior written approval from the appropriate agency, knowingly participate in the affairs
of any insured depository institution after they are suspended or removed from their position.
13. 609 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 129.
16. Id. at 129.
17. Id. at 129-30.
18. Id. at 130.
19. 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
20. Id. at 1309.
21. The Comptroller asserted jurisdiction under what was then 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(2) (1989).
See Stoddard, 868 F.2d at 1309. Prior to FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) contained two subsections
granting removal authority to the banking agencies under differing conditions. These subsections
have now been replaced by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(l) (1989).
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the Federal Reserve (Fed), the order to remove Stoddard was finally issued three-
and-a-half years after his resignation.2"
The circuit court's analysis of Stoddard's challenge to the removal order was
surprisingly straightforward. The court was cognizant that the Fed's sole purpose
in "removing" Stoddard after he had resigned was to expose him to the provisions
of 12 U.S.C. § 1818j). That section, as it then read, would have provided
criminal sanctions should Stoddard have later become involved with the same
bank. 3 Indeed, the Fed argued for the removal by emphasizing that without
agency access to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(j), bank officials could escape the sanctions
that Congress intended for them by effecting last-second resignations. However,
the Stoddard court rejected the Fed's effort to make subsection (e) applicable to
former officials, opining that "One cannot remove what isn't there.'' Accord-
ingly, the court vacated the Fed's order of removal. 25
Congress took dead aim at the Stoddard decision in drafting FIRREA.
FIRREA provides in subsection (i)26 that an official's resignation has no effect
on the agencies' authority to issue a notice of removal, as long as the notice was
served within six years of the resignation. FIRREA also makes this rule retro-
active, covering resignations that occurred long before enactment of FIRREA. 27
In explaining its authority to make such a provision retroactive, the Joint
Conference Committee explained that, "This section does not create a new
offense; it is procedural in nature, and can therefore be applied retroactively to
yet undiscovered misconduct and to currently pending supervisory matters that
have been stayed awaiting Congressional action." 2 The House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs justified the retroactivity provision by
proposing that the new subsection (i)(3) was intended to "clarify" the "ambi-
guity" addressed by Stoddard, and left no doubt that the new section was
intended to cure the problem of resignations which were meant "to thwart the
initiation of an agency enforcement action.'"'" Accordingly, if the courts agree
that this change in the statute was merely "procedural," Stoddard is overruled
and officials who resigned years before FIRREA's enactment are subject to its
removal provisions. Indeed, the Second Circuit has recently refused to follow
Stoddard. Instead, that court relied on subsection (i) and refused to enjoin
removal proceedings against two former directors of a bank that had been
liquidated by the Comptroller of the Currency.30
II. SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL PRACTICE
After serving the targeted official with a "notice of removal," which must
contain a statement of facts constituting the grounds asserted, 3 an agency hearing
22. Stoddard, 868 F.2d at 1310.
23. Id. at 1311. Had FIRREA been in effect, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(j) would have provided criminal
sanctions if Stoddard subsequently participated anywhere in the insured depository industry, not
merely in the same bank. See infra, part V.
24. Stoddard, 868 F.2d at 1310.
25. Id. at 1312.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(3) (1989).
27. Id.
28. H. Conf. R. No. 101-222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
432. The reference to Congressional inaction is undoubtedly related to the funding problems experi-
enced by federal regulators during the period when FHLBB and FSLIC were phased out.
29. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86.
30. See Greenberg v. Comptroller of the Currency, 938 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1991).
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(4) (1989), (formerly) 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(5) (1986).
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must be scheduled within 60 days. 2 If the action is one brought by the Comptroller
of the Currency, the findings of the ALJ must be certified to the Fed, which
decides whether the removal order shall issue.3"
Upon issuance of a notice of removal, the agency is empowered, prior to
any hearing or response from the targeted official, to immediately suspend the
official if the agency determines that suspension is necessary for the protection
of the institution or its depositors?' Once the suspension order is issued, the
targeted official has only 10 days in which to apply to the district court for a
stay of the order." The suspension commences upon service of the suspension
order and continues until lifted by court order or until after the banking agency
makes its final decision.3'
The courts' jurisdiction with regard to suspension and removal under 12
U.S.C. § 1818(e) is determined by two statutory subsections. Subsection (h)
provides for judicial review of final removal orders solely in the Circuit Courts
of Appeals. Subsection (i) withdraws jurisdiction from the courts by providing
that no court has jurisdiction to "affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance
or enforcement of any notice or order under [12 U.S.C. § 1818] or to review,
modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order. ' 37 However,
the proper application of both of these subsections is somewhat confused after
the district court decision in Somerfield v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion.3" In disposing of Somerfield's petition to enjoin his notice of removal for
lack of FDIC jurisdiction, the court made two questionable statements regarding
its own jurisdiction. The court asserted, without explanation, that it had no
jurisdiction to enjoin the removal procedure in light of subsection (i).39 While
this was technically correct, given the outstanding issue of fact concerning
Somerfield's resignation date, the implication that district courts are barred from
determining whether a banking agency has exceeded its statutory authority by
issuing a notice of removal appears to conflict with prior decisions under
subsection (i).'
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(3) (1989), (formerly) 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(4) (1986).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(0 (1989).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(3)(B) (1989). Jurisdiction for the stay hearing is in the District Court
of the District of Columbia or in the federal district court in the district where the institution's home
office is located. Appeal of the agencies' final orders is to the Court of Appeals of the Federal
District or to the court of appeals where the subject's home office is located, and must be made
within 30 days of service of the order. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2) (1989).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1989).
38. 609 F. Supp. 128. For explanation of the facts of this case, see supra text accompanying
notes 10-19.
39. Id. at 129. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1989) states in pertinent part:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section no court shall have jurisdiction to affect
by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under
this section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or
order.
Id.
40. See Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) did
not foreclose the district court from hearing challenge to action of the Comptroller of Currency
taken under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(1), in barring majority stockholder who was convicted of crime
from participation in bank, on the ground that the action exceeded the Comptroller's statutory
authority); See also Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1978);
First Nat'l Bank of Scotia v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D.D.C. 1982); and Mid America
Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 523 F. Supp. 568, 575 (D. Minn. 1980).
1991]
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Nothing in FISA or FIRREA expressly forbids the district courts from
entertaining challenges to agency actions on the ground that the limited agency
has exceeded its statutory authority. Subsection (i) is a withdrawal provision
which forbids judicial interference only with actions brought "under the statute."
Certainly, the district court should hear a challenge to an agency action if the
challenger alleges that the action is outside the agency's statutory authority. In
addition, it would be a strained reading of subsection (i) to hold that Congress
implicitly banned prior judicial review of the agencies' authority to act at the
same time it explicitly withdrew only the jurisdiction to review lawful agency
procedures.
However, the Supreme Court has taken the position that subsection (i)
withdraws all jurisdiction from the district courts "to review and enjoin the
[agencies') ongoing administrative proceedings. ' 4' Accordingly, challenges to agency
jurisdiction during removal or suspension proceedings are now foreclosed, other
than, perhaps, in stay applications under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(0.
Since suspension orders are issued ex parte in the absence of hearings, and
because a suspension order can be expected to be extremely disruptive to the
institution and the official, the courts should be somewhat circumspect in con-
tinuing the effectiveness of suspension orders in the face of stay applications.
Such reticence was displayed in [Anonymous] v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("Anonymous J-).4, In that case, FDIC issued a notice of removal
and immediate suspension to a targeted official, based upon the results of a
bank examination. This examination revealed a loan made in violation of state
banking law, as well as other questionable transactions. 4 In granting the targeted
official a stay of the suspension, pending completion of an FDIC removal
procedure, the district court made several interesting observations which led it to
strictly construe the agency's suspension authority.
In reviewing the statutory prerequisites for suspension orders, the court noted
the regrettably sparse guidance provided by Congress to the agencies. FISA
merely required the agency to "deem it necessary for the protection of the bank
or the interest of its depositors" for the suspension order to be issued." The
Anonymous I court considered the suspension order a "constraint on individual
liberty" and demanded that the agency undertake the requisite protection. 4 The
court bemoaned the statute's lack of a detailed list of factors for the agencies to
consider prior to issuing a suspension order and the absence of FDIC regulations
or guidelines to aid its employees in determining when suspensions were war-
ranted.46 Accordingly, the court felt that the FDIC was without a sufficient
41. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 4005
(U.S. Dec. 3, 1991) (No. 90-913, 90-914).
42. 617 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1985).
43. Id. at 514.
44. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(4) (1989) as it existed prior to FIRREA. The current version is no
more descriptive, requiring the agency to "determine[) that such action is necessary for the protection
of the depository institution or the interests of the depository institution's depositors." 12 U.S.C. §
1818(eX3)(A)(i) (1989).
45. Anonymous 1, 617 F. Supp. at 513..
46. Id. FDIC has since promulgated regulations regarding suspensions. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.
308.73. However, these regulations give no guidance on interpreting the statutory grounds for
suspension.
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explanation of how or why it deemed this official was deserving of a suspension,
raising serious due process concerns.47
In reviewing the target official's stay application, the Anonymous I court
also found that the potential damage to the targeted official's reputation was
sufficient to satisfy the "irreparable harm" requirement for injunctive relief.
Although the court observed that an injury to one's reputation is generally not
sufficient to establish irreparable harm, the court concluded that Congress had
granted the right to apply for a stay of suspensions as a recognition of the injury
to career inherent in the suspension procedure. To find additional support for
issuing the stay, the court referred to the presumption that removal hearings be
held in private4 under (then) 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) as evidence that Congress
recognized the potential damage brought on by these procedures and intended to
provide protection to the officials' reputations.
The Anonymous I court turned finally to the public interest concerns raised
by allowing the official to continue in office pending the removal process. In
holding that FDIC made an insufficient showing of danger to the public to
warrant an immediate suspension, the court stated that the FDIC had apparently
not even weighed the potential costs and benefits of permitting the officer to
continue his involvement pending the removal process. Accordingly, the court
entered a stay of the suspension order.
Given the broad discretion granted to the banking agencies by FISA and
FIRREA, targeted officials can be expected to utilize stay applications to disrupt
the orderly agency suspension and removal procedures. One approach will be to
petition the district courts for relief on grounds that the agencies have exceeded
their statutory authority or have failed to promulgate adequate regulations to
implement the statute. The interventionist language in Anonymous I will be
helpful to targeted officials in justifying disruption of the agency suspension and
removal process on these grounds. In addition, as discussed infra, in Part IV,
many of FIRREA's suspension and removal provisions appear to be fertile ground
for constitutional challenges. Indeed, Congress' attempt to permit the banking
agencies to determine the fate of bank officials largely without judicial interference
may be doomed by Congress' apparent overreaching in assigning under-defined
remedial powers to these agencies.
47. See Anonymous I, 617 F. Supp at 513-14. By contrast, the FIRREA House Committee
expressed no concern for "individual liberty" or due process in facilitating the agencies' ability to
remove officials in the absence of significant losses to institutions. The committee expressed its
opinion that "There is no constitutional or other right for an individual to remain in the financial
services industry.. ." seemingly reviving the discredited "right versus privilege" analysis of govern-
ment licensing. See FIRREA Report at 468, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 264.
48. This privacy concern was expressed in the FISA Report, which noted that hearings were to
be private unless both the agency and the individual agree that it should be public. FISA Report at
3539. FIRREA maintains the presumption of private hearings. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) (1989). However,
FIRREA has altered the existing scheme which protected targeted officials from publicity by providing
for immediate publication of all final orders. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u)(1) (1989). The FIRREA House
Report states that this provision was included due to "excessive secrecy" in agency supervisory
actions. The committee observed that "such secrecy does little to deter misconduct, but does serve
to ultimately worsen the problems of financial institutions." FIRREA Report 470, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 266.
1991]
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Ill. REMOVAL PREREQUISITES
Once the agency has selected a target official who is subject to its removal
authority, it is required to make three independent determinations prior to issuing
a removal notice.
A. Improper Conduct
As a prerequisite to issuing a notice of removal the agency must determine
that the official has undertaken some improper conduct. This improper conduct
must take one of three forms:
(1) violating a law, regulation, final cease-and-desist order, or written agreement
between the institution and the FDIC; or
(2) engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice in connection with any insured
depository institution; or
(3) committing a breach of fiduciary duty. 9
1. Violations of Law or Regulation
With respect to requirement (1) supra, there has been little judicial gloss. A
challenge may arise concerning the validity of an AL's determination that a
criminal statute has been violated, absent a conviction by an Article III court.
Under the procedures outlined in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e), the target official may be
subjected to an administrative hearing, without the constitutional protections
normally afforded to a criminal defendant, to determine whether the target has
violated a criminal statute.50 Although there is no reported decision addressing
this issue, one circuit court has recently foregone an opportunity to address the
concerns raised by this grant of authority to the agencies. Van Dyke v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System." In that case the ALJ had found
that Van Dyke, an officer and director of the Toy Bank, had been involved in
what the ALJ termed a "check kiting" scheme.5 2 The ALJ determined that Van
Dyke's involvement in the scheme was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp.
49. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(l)(A) (1989).
50. While it may not be desirable, from the point of view of the agency or the official, to have
a criminal trial as a prerequisite to removing a bank official, the reliance on an ALJ's findings of
criminal misbehavior is of concern for at least two reasons.
First, the undeniable stigma attached to having a banker's conduct declared criminal requires
that some constitutional safeguards be imposed at these hearings. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
363-64 (1970)(Court holding that the Due Process Clause required a heightened standard of proof as
defendant would be stigmatized by an adverse decision creating a criminal record). Perhaps increasing
the burden of proof for such a determination from a preponderance of the evidence to at least "clear
and convincing" would provide an adequate safeguard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-
24 (1979) (Court approving the use of a clear and convincing standard in civil suit where reputational
interests were in particular jeopardy).
Second, the ALJ's finding of criminal misbehavior can itself lead, at least indirectly, to extremely
stiff criminal penalties under 12 U.S.C. § 18180). In any event, finding criminal liability should
rarely be necessary for removal. As an alternative to showing the criminal violation, the agency may
show that the official breached a fiduciary duty or engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice in
connection with an insured depository institution. Given these alternatives, which could often be
found upon review of the same allegedly criminal conduct, there appears to be little justification for
permitting the AL's to determine criminal guilt.
51. 876 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1989).
52. Id. at 1378.
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V 1987), thus satisfying the improper conduct prerequisite for removal.5 3 As the
circuit court accepted without discussion the ALJ's determination that Van Dyke
had violated the statute, it is clear that the Eighth Circuit was not troubled by
a determination of criminal guilt being made outside of the Article III courts
and without the requisite constitutional protections. It does appear, however that
the ALJ was sensitive to this issue. The Van Dyke opinion hints that the AL's
determination may have been subject to a standard of proof greater than a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ's holding was that Van Dyke's conduct
"clearly fit within the prescription of [section] 1344."5 4 Perhaps the ALJ used
at least a "clear and convincing" standard of proof in finding the violation and
this may have been sufficient to overcome constitutional concerns.
From the legislative history of FISA, it appears that even the most technical
and minor regulatory infractions will suffice to satisfy the improper conduct
element. The Senate Committee opined that limiting the predicate violations to
those involving "personal dishonesty" sufficiently protected banking officials
from abuses of agency power.15 Therefore, the magnitude of the violation was
not meant to be a meaningful aspect of the "improper conduct" analysis.
However, under FISA there was arguably no provision for a lifetime industry
ban. 56 Now that the stakes have been raised by FIRREA, it is likely that courts
will resist approving an agencies' lifetime ban punishments for minor, technical
infractions.
2. Engaged or Participated in an Unsafe or Unsound Practice in Connection
with Any Insured Depository Institution or Committed a Breach of his
Fiduciary Duty.
It remains unclear what an agency will have to prove if it intends to rely
upon its determination that the target official "engaged or participated in any
unsafe or unsound practice in connection with any insured depository institu-
tion..... 57 or that the official "breached his fiduciary duty." However, the
two grounds will tend to merge with respect to any official who has a fiduciary
duty to the subject institution and who actively participates in a practice at that
institution which is challenged by the agency. The result will be a collapsed
analysis of the target's behavior under both alternatives, as it seems likely that
any fiduciary participating in an unsafe banking practice will thereby also breach
his fiduciary duty. Such a collapsed analysis was performed by the ALJ in Van
Dyke.
In Van Dyke the ALJ was faced with a scheme in which Van Dyke wrote,
without sufficient funds on deposit,, alternating checks between his checking
account at the Toy Bank (which by regulation could not honor an overdraft of
director Van Dyke's checking account) and his chronically overdrawn account at
a second bank, Norwest. 58 Norwest had consistently honored his overdrafts in
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added).
55. See FISA report at 3539.
56. See infra part IV.
57. Indeed, the Senate committee considering FISA candidly admitted that 'Unsafe' and
'unsound' have no definite or fixed meaning." FISA report, at 3539.
58. Van Dyke, 876 F.2d at 1378.
1991]
Journal of Legislation
the past and Van Dyke's Toy Bank account was kept current through Norwest's
continued payment of Van Dyke's overdrafts. 9 The purpose of Van Dyke's
scheme was to temporarily forestall Norwest from collecting on the overdrafts
until Van Dyke could arrange a loan with a third bank.
The AJ found that Van Dyke's "check kiting" practice was an unsafe and
unsound banking practice in addition to a breach of his fiduciary duty to the
Toy Bank.6° These findings were affirmed by the Fed and were not challenged
by Van Dyke on appeal. 61
Van Dyke's collapsed analysis of an official's "participation" in unsafe or
unsound practices and his breach of fiduciary duty is compelled, it would appear,
unless a fiduciary is charged with a culpable omission during the course of his
oversight function, thereby possibly precluding a finding of "participation." It
is also quite possible, however, that a court would deem negligent oversight to
be an unsafe or unsound practice, reviving the collapsed analysis.
A negligent oversight situation where the collapsed analysis was not used
was reported in Brickner v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.62 In that
case, the FDIC found that two directors had breached their fiduciary duties by
failing to control the conduct of the bank's cashier. The cashier had made several
large, unauthorized extensions of credit to a particular bank customer by failing
to post debits to the customer's account. In addition, the cashier repeatedly
extended credit to this customer by allowing check overdrafts and by holding the
customer's unpaid items in the Bank's correspondent account.63 The bank presi-
dent discovered these practices and asked the cashier to cease these activities, but
the cashier persisted." Afterward, the two directors discovered that the cashier
persisted in these unsafe practices, but they failed to ensure that the practices
ceased. 65 The customer eventually defaulted on $1.2 million worth of credit
extended by the cashier. 66
In reviewing the FDIC's determination that the two directors had breached
their fiduciary duties, the court stated that such an inquiry was a "mixed question
of fact and law.' '67 This "mixed question" approach, of course, would grant an
appellate court greater latitude to review an AL's determinations than if the
determinations were considered pure issues of fact. However, the Brickner court
found no opportunity to define the appropriate scope of review of the AU's
findings, as the court determined that it would find the two directors' conduct
a breach of fiduciary duty even if reviewing de novo.68 Accordingly, the agencies
and the industry were left without guidance as to the proper scope of review for
such a determination.
Brickner's sole reliance upon finding a breach of fiduciary duty in satisfying
the improper conduct requirement illustrates that courts need not perform a
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1378-79. (emphasis added)
61. Id. at 1379.
62. 747 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 1200.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1201.
68. Id. at 1202.
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collapsed analysis of "breach of fiduciary duty" and "participation in an unsafe
or unsound banking practice" when reviewing the conduct of fiduciaries. Indeed,
Brickner illustrates that the separate analysis makes it easier for an agency to
effect removal of a fiduciary. It is not certain that the two directors could have
been found to have "participated" in an "unsafe or unsound practice" by failing
to stop the cashier from extending credit. Were it not for the statute's separate
breach of fiduciary duty alternative the two directors may have escaped their
fate.
B. Negative Consequences
Having made determinations that overcome the initial hurdles, the agency
must find that the improper conduct resulted in certain negative consequences.
Here the agency must find one of the following three negative consequences of
the improper conduct:
(1) the affected institution has suffered or will probably suffer damage;
(2) the interest of the depositors has been or could be prejudiced; or
(3) the officer or director received a benefit as a result of the challenged conduct.69
There has been little helpful discussion in the cases as to how these three
requirements may be satisfied. From the statutory language one suspects that
proving actual damage to the institution or actual prejudice to the depositors will
raise no unusual fact-finding issues. The more difficult issues will arise in devising
a standard for finding "probable" damage to the institution, given that the
probable damage need not be financial in nature.70 Whether finding a practice
that might cause damage will suffice, or whether finding a practice probably
would cause damage will be required, cannot be said at this time. Indeed, the
meaning of those alternatives, even if the courts eventually settled upon one, is
unclear. Similar issues present themselves in requiring proof that depositors'
interests "could be prejudiced." However, since it is undoubtedly easier to find
potential damage to the institution than to the (substantially insured) depositors,
the depositor alternative will rarely be useful to the agencies.
Congress has given guidance in FIRREA on how much "damage" or
"prejudice" must be demonstrated to clear the "negative consequences" hurdle
to removal. Under FISA, the agency was required to show that the institution
had or would suffer substantial damages before a negative consequence would
be established. 7' In the alternative, prior to FIRREA, the agency was required
to show that the depositors had or would be seriously prejudiced by reason of
the challenged practices.72 In FIRREA, both of these qualifiers were dropped.7
Accordingly, a much smaller quantum of damage to the institution or prejudice
to the depositors, real or merely threatened, will now suffice. By way of
explanation, the House Committee reported that FIRREA "would allow an
agency to proceed with removal or prohibition action[s], where warranted, without
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(i)(B) (1989).
70. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(i)(B)(i) (1989).
71. See (former) 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (1986).
72. Id.
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(i)(B)(ii).
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having to quantify losses to the institution or the degree of prejudice to the
depositors." 7 4
The inclusion of the third alternative negative consequence requirement,
"benefit to the official," is interesting, as it can eliminate the need to prove that
the challenged conduct produced any negative effect on the insured depository
industry. In addition, FIRREA widened the reach of this third alternative. Under
FISA, the third alternative negative consequence could only be satisfied if the
official had received a financial benefit from his misdeeds. 7 FIRREA eliminated
that qualifier and any benefit will now suffice. 76
One probable result of FIRREA's inclusion of this "benefit to the official"
means of finding a negative consequence is to foreclose the "no harm, no foul"
defense, except in the rare situation where there was an unsafe practice which
did not threaten the institution or depositors and did not benefit the official.
However, it is extremely doubtful that such a situation would generate sufficient
agency interest to warrant a removal action.
In trying to determine the current viability of the "no harm, no foul"
defense, the court's discussion of the official's "no harm no foul" defenses in
Van Dyke, supra, is informative. Van Dyke's first such argument attempted to
limit the inquiry to the scheme's effect upon his own institution. Van Dyke
argued that any consideration of his personal dishonesty, for the purposes of
removal from the Toy Bank, must focus entirely on that institution.77 Van Dyke
claimed that the Toy Bank was not harmed and was never at risk because the
second bank, Norwest, had always honored his overdrafts. From this premise he
concluded that any risk of loss was on Norwest and his removal from the Toy
Bank was unwarranted . 7
The court gave this argument little consideration, admonishing that "to
suggest that we focus exclusively on Van Dyke's dealings with Norwest in
evaluating his conduct as a Toy Bank officer and director ignores the inherent
multiple-bank characteristics of a check-kiting scheme." 7 9 While this statement
would appear to leave the door open for excusing a scheme in which all of the
conduct was unrelated to the official's own bank, there is nothing in the tone
of Van Dyke to suggest to a hopeful targeted official that the Eighth Circuit
would find that distinction persuasive.
Van Dyke's second, seemingly more persuasive attempt at a "no harm, no
foul" defense arose from the fact that apparently neither bank lost any money
in the transactions. However, the court's reaction to the defense that no bank
was harmed was no more favorable than its reaction to Van Dyke's first argument,
explaining that "we think it unrealistic for Van Dyke to suggest the Board is
powerless to respond to an officer's manipulative, self-dealing activity until actual
harm to the Bank occurs." 80
74. See supra note 28, at § 903.
75. See (former) 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (1986).
76. The negative consequence requirement may now be satisfied if the official "has received
financial gain or other benefit by reason of such violation, practice, or breach;" 12 U.S.C. §
1818(e)(l)(B)(iii) (1989) (emphasis added).
77. Van Dyke v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 876 F.2d 1377, 1380 (8th Cir.
1989).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The District Court in Anonymous I, supra took a similar dim view of the
"no harm, no foul" defense. There the targeted official was accused of making
questionable loans. He defended against the allegation that the loans were unsound
by offering to prove that the loans were being paid off, with interest. 8' In reacting
to the official's defense based on subsequent repayment, the court noted that
"subsequent partial repayment of an insufficiently secured or collateralized loan
does not vitiate the initial determination that the loan was imprudent when made
and that the bank has therefore suffered a significant injury. ' 82
As can be seen, the "no harm, no foul" defense was not powerful under
FISA. Under FIRREA, it can be expected to fare no better.
C. Scienter
Having satisfied the aforementioned prerequisites to removal, the agency
must determine that the challenged conduct involved the requisite scienter. Sat-
isfying FIRREA's scienter requirement requires that the agency determine that
the official's actions demonstrate either "personal dishonesty" or "a willful or
continuing disregard ...for the safety or soundness of such insured depository
institution or business institution." 83 Given the existence of judicially approved
interpretations of these key statutory phrases in Van Dyke, ALJ's have reliable
standards against which they can measure the scienter of officers' conduct.
1. Personal Dishonesty
The detailed discussion of "personal dishonesty" in Van Dyke gives sub-
stantial guidance on the interpretation that term is likely to receive at the agency
and the appeals court levels. In viewing Van Dyke's check - kiting scheme, the
ALJ determined that the relevant examples of Van Dyke's conduct did "not
demonstrate personal dishonesty nor [did] they seem to be of such a nature as
to involve a disregard for the safety or soundness of the Bank."" In determining
that Van Dyke's conduct did not demonstrate personal dishonesty or the requisite
statutory disregard, the ALJ "equated personal dishonesty with an intent to gain
at the expense of others." 85 Accordingly, the ALJ did not recommend removal.
In its review of the ALJ's decision, the Fed disagreed with the ALJ's
standard for scienter. The Fed then articulated its own standard for finding
personal dishonesty, much of which was upheld by the circuit court. In considering
the proper boundaries of actionable "personal dishonesty," the Van Dyke court
deferred to the Fed's reasonable position that personal dishonesty need not
amount to civil fraud.A However, the circuit court then upheld the Fed's expansive
standard for determining whether conduct demonstrates personal dishonesty. The
court approved-the Fed's position that such conduct "may include that which
illustrates a 'disposition to lie, cheat[,J or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity[;] ...misrepresentation of facts and deliberate deception by pretense
and stealth; ...[or] want of fairness and [straightforwardness]."87
81. [Anonymous] v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D.D.C. 1985) ("Anon-
ymous I").
82. Id.
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(C) (1989).
84. Van Dyke, 876 F.2d at 1379.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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This astoundingly broad checklist will provide AL's with a "standard" that
will make finding personal dishonesty possible under the widest variety of
circumstances. The expansive phrase "disposition to" allows the AU to focus
on more than just the examples of conduct in evidence. It permits (compels?) a
psychological analysis of the target official to determine the propensity of that
official to undertake dishonest actions, given that he undertook the conduct in
evidence. If this analysis fails to reveal sufficient propensity to be dishonest in
the future, perhaps due to deft expert testimony by the targeted official's
psychological expert, the agency may still find plenty of fertile ground in the
Van Dyke standard. According to Van Dyke, the AU may find that the conduct
was personally dishonest if the conduct demonstrates a want of fairness or
straightforwardness. One struggles to identify a legal standard more susceptible
to due process, void-for-vagueness objections.
As can be seen, even before FIRREA the "personal dishonesty" alternative
to finding scienter was a complete abrogation of any traditional culpability
requirement. This alternative means of finding scienter does not require a deter-
mination of willful, knowing, or even negligent behavior to justify removal.
Honest business practices which are found to be unfair or which lack "straight-
forwardness" will suffice to establish the required scienter. Accordingly, the
scienter prerequisite to removal will present only a minor barrier to removal
efforts of the banking agencies, given this expansive view of "personal dishon-
esty."
2. Willful or Continuing Disregard
In affirming the Fed's determination that Van Dyke had committed "willful
disregard for the safety or soundness of the [Toy] Bank," the Eighth Circuit
also approved the Fed's guidelines for defining that key term.8 The Fed guidelines
required consideration of whether Van Dyke's conduct "potentially exposed the
Bank to an abnormal risk of loss or harm contrary to prudent banking prac-
tices." 19 This definition of "willful or continuing disregard" directs AL's to
focus on the disregard for the potential for harm as a result of the questioned
banking practices, but gives little guidance on the culpability standard to be
applied.
Guidance on the necessary mental state that will support a finding of "willful
and continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of the bank" may be gleaned
from the Eighth Circuit's decision in Brickner.9°
In Brickner, the two targeted directors defended against removal by arguing
that even if they had breached their fiduciary duty, that alone did not warrant
removal. The directors asserted that to justify removal under the statute, there
must be a finding that they willfully did something to injure that bank. In
response the court observed that the FDIC need not show both willful and
continuing disregard to justify removal. 9' Additionally, the court concluded that
although a showing of continuing disregard requires some degree of knowledge,
88. Id. at 1380.
89. Id.
90. For a discussion of the facts of Brickner, see supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
91. Brickner v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 747 F.2d 1198, 1202-03 (8th Cir. 1984).
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it requires a lower degree of intent than "willful disregard." Using this approach,
the court concluded that the directors' knowledge for a period of months that
the cashier was engaging in unsafe and unsound banking practices was sufficient
to show continuing disregard for the safety and soundness of the bank. Accord-
ingly, Brickner, if followed, would lower the culpability that the agency needs
to prove for multiple related instances of forbidden conduct from "willful" to
"knowing." Since few removal actions will involve a single, isolated infraction,
Brickner would eliminate the "willful" culpability standard for most removal
actions.
It would appear that the ease in finding culpability under Brickner, when
combined with the checklist approach to finding "personal dishonesty" under
Van Dyke, creates a scienter standard which fails to focus on evilmindedness.
Accordingly, the scienter requirement will not be a significant restraint on the
agencies' apparent ability to target honest but risky conduct on the part of bank
officials. In light of these two cases and the FIRREA sanctions, bank officials
will be understandably reluctant to undertake activities not already recognized as
"prudent banking practices," given the potentially career-ending consequences of
undertaking risky banking activities.
IV. THE EXTENT OF THE REMOVAL POWER
After a banking agency makes the determinations described in Part III, it
may serve upon the targeted official a written notice of the agency's intention
to remove him from office and/or to prohibit him from further participation in
"any insured depository institution." 9" Does this mean that all suspended or
removed officials are automatically subject to an industrywide ban, or must the
agency order removal on a bank-by-bank basis? This issue, in the case of removal,
has not been judicially addressed. However, in a pre-FIRREA case, [Anonymous]
v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,93 ("Anonymous IF'), there was con-
siderable discussion of the meaning of "any insured depository institution" within
in the context of a 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) & (2) suspension order.Y In Anonymous
II, the targeted official held positions at several banks. Upon examination of one
of those banks, FDIC served notice on the target official that it was initiating
proceedings to not only remove him from his office at the examined bank, but
to bar him from participation in all federally insured banks by authority of 12
U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1). 91 In addition, the official was suspended from his office and
prohibited from further participation in all federally insured depository institutions
pending resolution of the removal proceedings.9
In reviewing FDIC's authority to issue this blanket suspension, the court
noted that Congress had drawn a distinction in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) & (2) (as
those subsections existed at that time) between misconduct at the targeted official's
own institution and misconduct with respect to other institutions or businesses.
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (1989).
93. 619 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1985).
94. After FIRREA. the suspension provisions are contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(eX3) (1982).
95. See Anonymous II, 619 F. Supp. at 867. The Court referred to the then-existing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(e)(I) & (2) (1982); amended 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (e)(1), (2)(b) (1989).
96. Id. at 867.
1991]
Journal of Legislation
The court noted that when the disputed misconduct concerned institutions where
the targeted official was not employed, an additional finding of either "personal
dishonesty," or "willful or continuing disregard for a banks' safety and sound-
ness," was required before the removal notice may be issued.9 Noting these
more stringent requirements for measuring conduct occurring outside the targeted
official's institution, the Anonymous II court concluded that Congress could not
have intended that officials could be suspended from institutions with whom they
had no contact. The court stated that FDIC had the authority to suspend the
target from an unlimited number of banks, but had to do so on a bank-by-bank,
individualized basis." In dictum, the court also opined that the bank-by-bank
requirement applied to removal as well as suspension."
The Anonymous I position barring blanket suspensions and removals appears
to be in great jeopardy after FIRREA, despite FIRREA's reaffirmation of the
same "any insured institution" language. First, FIRREA no longer distinguishes
between conduct at the targeted official's bank and conduct directed toward
other institutions. In addition, under the language of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7),
entitled "Industrywide prohibition," officials subject to suspension or removal
orders appear to be automatically subject to a ban from participation in to the
entire insured depository system,1'0 absent an express written exception from the
appropriate agency.'10 However, the statute fails to state specifically whether the
suspension or removal order must identify the individual forbidden institutions
or whether the industrywide ban is assumed, absent an articulated exception. 1 1
Accordingly, the Anonymous I requirement of an institution-by-institution order
may still hold some life.
V. PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL
ORDERS
Much of the attractiveness of the removal procedure to the agencies emanates
from the subsequent availability of the criminal provisions of subsection (j). This
subsection provides stiff criminal penalties'03 for any individual subject to an
effective removal order who knowingly participates in the business of "any
insured depository institution," absent agency permission.' °0 This blanket ban
permits the agency issuing the order to control or eliminate the official's partic-
97. Id. at 870.
98. Id. at 872.
99. Id.
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(A) (1989).
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(B) (1989). Indeed, a strict reading of the statute would forbid the
official from having discussions with the agencies themselves on any matters other than the removal
proceedings. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(d) (1989).
102. Support for the continued existence of a requirement that the agency make an institution-
by-institution determination of the scope of a suspension or removal order may be found in 12
U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(B). This paragraph provides agencies with the power to grant applications for
exceptions to suspension or removal orders which "prohibit[] such party from participating in the
conduct of the affairs of an insured depository institution." Id. (emphasis added). This language can
be read by the hopeful official as assuming that the orders would identify the particular institutions
affected.
103. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818() (1989) providing fines up to $1,000,000 in addition to imprisonment
of up to 5 years.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (1989).
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ipation in the insured banking community indefinitely, and apparently moots the
issue presented in Part IV of whether the order itself must designate the scope
of the ban.
Before FIRREA was enacted, subsection (j) provided that criminal penalties
were applicable to officials who were subject to any effective notice or order
"which is an order which has become final" under subsections (e)(4) & (e)(5).
These were the FISA subsections authorizing suspensions and removals respec-
tively. FIRREA eliminated this "final order" qualification in subsection (j). Prior
to FIRREA, the language of former subsection (e)(4) made it unclear whether
participation during a suspension, which may not have been pursuant to a "final
order," triggered the penalties of subsection (j). However, subsection (j) now
clearly makes it a criminal act to knowingly participate, without prior written
approval of the appropriate regulatory agency, in the affairs of any insured
depository institution while "an order [is] in effect under subsection (e)[.]" As
subsection (e) now specifically authorizes orders for both suspensions and re-
movals, there can no longer be serious doubt that subsection (j) applies equally
to officials subject to either suspension or removal orders. Thus, FIRREA has
effectively created an automatic blanket suspension, with severe criminal penalties
for its breach, through the operation of section 1818(j).
VI. CONCLUSION
To paraphrase an old legal maxim, tough situations make for bad laws. The
101st Congress was faced with a crisis which FISA and other existing legislation
appeared inadequate to address. The result was the monster called FIRREA.
The suspension and removal provisions of FIRREA present numerous con-
stitutional questions. For instance, they implicate due process concerns through
their depravation of personal liberty to pursue one's occupation in the absence
of statutory guidelines or adequate procedural opportunities to respond to charges.
Indeed, certain aspects appear to violate the constitutional ban on ex post facto
laws. 105 FIRREA also authorizes stiff criminal penalties based on findings of
criminal violations by administrative law judges, without any provision for the
constitutional protections generally available to criminal defendants in an Article
III court. In addition, FIRREA creates multi-alternative methods of finding
actionable conduct which are so loose that prosecutorial discretion appears to be
the only meaningful restraint on mass removal of bank officials. We may imagine
a bank officer who resigned four years ago; who committed a minor, technical
infraction; whose conduct did not threaten the welfare of any institution; but
who received a personal benefit from the infraction; and whose conduct illustrated
a want of fairness to another party. Under the existing case law and FIRREA,
this official can be banned for life from the insured depository industry.
The repercussions of the suspension and removal provisions of FIRREA are,
of course, undetermined at this time. However, these provisions threaten to have
the unfortunate effect of stifling innovative methods of improving the condition
of insured depository institutions. In attempting to improve the condition of their
banks, officials are now unlikely to implement untested, imaginative banking
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 3.
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practices or even sure-fire practices that might exploit weaknesses of other
financial institutions. These methods, if unsuccessful, may be deemed "unsafe
or unsound," or may be determined to illustrate a "want of fairness." Such
determinations could lead to a career-ending ban by the banking agencies.
FIRREA's extension of removal powers to accountants and lawyers is also
troubling and, perhaps, counterproductive. These professionals (and their insurers)
are already reeling from the deluge civil lawsuits brought as a result of their
work for distressed financial institutions. The added possibility of permanent
blanket bans in addition to these potential liabilities could lead firms with viable
alternatives to direct their resources toward clients outside the insured depository
industry, or at least away from insured institutions in financial trouble. This
would leave troubled insured institutions without access to talented professional
assistance at the very time they need it most.
The most probable outcome of the sudden, vast expansion of the suspension
and removal powers under FIRREA is that the courts will be called upon to
temper the zeal of Congress and the agencies. While this is not the preferred
method of implementing national policy, it is a familiar one. How the courts
respond will help determine the fate of the insured depository system.
